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     The main goal of this paper is to study the determinants of bank interest margins 
and profitability for some European countries in the last decade. We use a set of bank 
characteristics, macroeconomic and regulatory indicators as well as financial structure 
variables in order to explain interest margins and profitability. We evaluate whether 
European countries, sharing a common bond - European Monetary System 
membership - also share the same interest margin and profitability determinants. 
Beyond the usual micro variables, the paper examines whether bank size and 
capitalisation as well as inflation, economic growth, exchange rate policy, financial 
liberalisation and exchange rate turmoil, could be accepted as explanatory variables 
for bank performance. At the same time, we evaluate the impact of the EMS crisis of 
1992/3/4 on the net interest margin and bank profitability, as well as the impact of the 




     This paper follows in the footsteps of Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), 
Bartholdy, Boyle and Stover (1997) and Barth, Nolle and Rice (1997), and several 
specifications of the equation 
 
ijtjjjtjijti0ijt uCXB +β+β+β+β=Π                                                                         (1) 
 
will be estimated (with Πijt the net interest margin or ROA/ROE for bank i in country 
j at time t, Bijt represents a vector of characteristics of bank i in country j at time t, Xjt 
is a vector of control variables for country j at time t, and Cj is a vector of country 
dummy variables). 
 
The focus of the paper will be the investigation of possible influences of a standard set 
of bank-specific explanatory variables (along with other variables taking account of 
cross-country differences in the regulatory environment in which banks do operate) on 
bank profitability and interest margins. Although in many studies empirical results are 
essentially unchanged with respect to the used measure of bank performance, we will 
use three different indicators of ex-post bank performance: the robustness of our 
results is at stake. The bank specific variables we use are market share, operating 
costs, capital to asset ratio and loan to asset ratio (to account for bank-specific risk 
insofar as the dependent variable is not risk-adjusted). Among the macroeconomic 
variables we use the inflation rate, the unemployment rate, and the nominal effective 
exchange rate. We will also use dummy variables to account for the range of 
permissible activities as well as the existence of crises of the European Monetary 
System, and a time trend. 
 
Some authors have claimed that the relationship between the explanatory and 
explained variables is not linear and is not stable (v.g. Swamy et all 1996). On the 
other hand, it is not easy to design a single model that completely describes bank 
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performance. Therefore we will test different specifications of the general model (1) 
in order to avoid the risk of misspecifying the functional form of the relationship. We 
will not, however, report all our results. 
 
III. DATA SET AND VARIABLE DEFINITION 
 
The dependent variable is a measure of ex-post bank performance. In order to test the 
robustness of our results we use four different alternatives: Interest Margin (IM = 
Interest received – Interest paid), Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity 
(ROE). NIM is alternatively defined as IM/Total Assets or IM/Equity. ROA is Pre-tax 
Profit/Total Assets and ROE=Pre-tax Profits/Equity. 
 
We include three types of explanatory variables in our estimation: microeconomic, 
domestic-macroeconomic, and policy and macro-financial variables. Among the 
microeconomic variables we include the ratio of the Total Employment Costs/Total 
Assets (Labor/A) as a proxy for operating costs, the Equity to Total Assets ratio 
(Equity/A), the Total Loans to Total Assets ratio (Loans/A) and bank market share 
(MS). 
It is expected that banks with higher operating costs (higher Labor/A) will have higher 
net interest margins (in order to survive) and lower ROA and ROE (everything else 
constant, banks will have lower pre-tax profits). Differences in operating costs may 
also capture differences in business and product mix or even differences in the range 
and quality of services offered. 
We expect that the higher Equity/A ratio, the lower need to external funding and 
therefore higher NIM and profits. It is also a sign that well-capitalized banks face 
lower costs of going bankrupt and thus their cost of funding is reduced. 
The ratio Loans/Assets is the ratio Total debtors and equivalent/Total Assets. 
Traditionally, banks are intermediaries between lenders and borrowers. Other things 
constant, the more deposits are transformed into loans, the higher the interest margin 
and profits. However, if a bank needs to incur higher risk in order to have a higher 
loan-to-asset ratio, then profits may decrease.  
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We also expect that bank market share (MS) is positively correlated with our 
dependent bank profitability variables. The market share variable captures effects that 
are not related to efficiency, such as product differentiation. Assuming price 
competition, a bank is able to sell at higher prices and to have a higher market share if 
its products are differentiated from those of its competitors. This positive relationship 
between market share and profitability may not exist, however, if we have product 
differentiation but market demand is small relative to firm size. The MS variable is 
defined as bank’s Loans divided by Country’s Domestic Credit1.  
Among the domestic macroeconomic variables we include the real GDP growth (GDP), the 
unemployment rate (UR)2 and the inflation rate (INF)3.  Adverse macroeconomic conditions 
hurt banks by increasing the share of non-performing loans in the economy. Thus we 
expect an increase in the real growth of GDP to increase bank performance. Low or 
declining aggregate growth rate may weaken the debt servicing capacity of domestic 
borrowers and contribute to increasing credit risk. We expect higher unemployment 
rates to have a negative effect on bank interest margins and profitability. High 
inflation is associated with high nominal interest rates and may also be viewed as a 
proxy for poor macroeconomic management. High inflation is often associated with 
higher relative price volatility, which makes the accurate assessment of credit and 
market risks more difficult. On the other hand, a significant and rapid reduction in the 
rate of inflation could lead to lower nominal income and cash flows, affecting the 
liquidity and solvency of financial institutions. 
With regard to policy and financial variables we include the nominal effective 
exchange rate index (EXR)4 to capture the impact of the exchange rate policy on bank 
performance. To attest the effect of financial liberalization we include a dummy 
variable (DCFPS). In Portugal and Spain, the final step towards financial 
liberalization was the liberalization of short-term capital movements in 1992 in 
Portugal and in 1993 in Spain, while in the other two countries all capital movements 
were already free. Accordingly, DCFPS variable is equal to 1 if the country is 
                                                          
1 We were unable to get information on total bank loans at the country level. Therefore, the 
denominator is Domestic Credit of the country. 
2 The Eurostat definition of unemployment as a % of civilian active population. 
3 The Eurostat definition of the annual % change of the GDP deflator at market prices. 
4 The Eurostat definition of the nominal effective exchange rate, base 100=1991; performance vis-à-vis 
the rest of the 22 industrialized countries. 
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Portugal and the year is 1992 and beyond, or the country is Spain and the year is 1993 
and beyond. 
To capture the impact of the European Monetary System (EMS) crisis, we include 
another dummy variable (CRIS). The EMS crisis started in August 1992 and ends up, 
for most of the member’s countries, in August 1993, with the widening of the 
exchange rate bands. Portugal is the exception. In fact, the Portuguese escudo 
continued to be under pressure until the last EMS final realignment, in March 1995. 
Therefore, the CRIS variable is equal to 1 if the year is 1992 or 1993 (all countries), 
or 1994 and the country is Portugal. 
We also include 3 country-dummy variables to attest for other specific national 
relevant factors: D1 variable is equal to 1 if the country is Portugal; D2 variable is 
equal to 1 if the country is Spain; D3 variable is equal to 1 if the country is France. 
Finally, we include a time trend variable: YEAR. 
 
In this paper we study banks from four different EU countries (Portugal, Spain, 
France and Germany). Table 1 shows the distribution of banks, by country and year. 
The sample is reasonably balanced, and bank-specific variables (table 2) do not show 
any ‘strange’ figures. Accounting data from DATASTREAM is used for banks from 
Spain, France and Germany. As for Portuguese banks, accounting data from banks’ 
annual balance sheet and income statement is used. As for UR, INF, EXR and 
Domestic Credit, we use “Économie Européenne”, nº 70, 2000 (Commission 
Européenne, Direction Générale ‘Affaires Économiques et Financières’). 
 
  Table 1: Number of banks from each country in the data set 
Years Portugal Spain France Germany TOTAL 
1986 8 5 0 8 21 
1987 8 6 0 8 22 
1988 8 7 2 8 25 
1989 8 7 2 8 25 
1990 8 7 3 8 26 
1991 8 7 3 9 27 
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1992 8 7 14 9 38 
1993 8 6 15 9 38 
1994 8 7 15 9 39 
1995 8 7 17 9 41 
1996 8 13 18 10 49 
1997 8 14 19 10 51 
1998 0 14 19 10 43 
1999 0 8 15 9 32 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of some variables (%) 
 









Mean 2.54 1.06 6.25 1.43 109.45 4.18 
Max 8.01 6.29 26.02 3.14 989.36 33.24 
Min -1.67 -2.62 0.98 0.11 27.48 0.02 






     Equation 1 was estimated by least squares with the panel of 477 observations. The 
White heteroskedasticity test was performed and did not allow the acceptance of the 
null hypothesis. Therefore, we used White-consistent standard deviations. Results are 
in tables 3 to 5.5,6 
      
      
                                                          
5 Under the suspicion that two explanatory variables (Equity/Assets and Loan/Assets) could be 
endogenous, we used the Hausman endogeneity test. The null hypothesis of exogeneity was accepted at 
the 5% level, but rejected at the 10% significance level. Therefore we reestimated equation (1) by 
TSLS. Results were not substantially different and are not reported. 
6 Results are robust to the use of Assets or Equity in the denominator of the dependent variable, and we 
do not report them all. 
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Table 3: Least square results. Dependent Variable is IM/ASSETS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.799791 0.366014 -2.185135 0.0294 
LABOR/A 1.397429 0.136901 10.20757 0.0000 
EQUITY/A 0.110296 0.023534 4.686731 0.0000 
LOAN/A 0.023527 0.004637 5.073225 0.0000 
MS 0.008137 0.007843 1.037518 0.3000 
UR -0.030525 0.034397 -0.887425 0.3753 
INF -0.102139 0.036798 -2.775660 0.0057 
EXR -1.77E-05 0.000147 -0.120431 0.9042 
CRIS 0.002852 0.001449 1.968705 0.0496 
DCFPS -0.013428 0.003592 -3.738193 0.0002 
D1 0.023207 0.004198 5.527786 0.0000 
D2 0.019599 0.006007 3.262728 0.0012 
D3 -0.002845 0.001698 -1.675304 0.0946 
YEAR 0.017382 0.007952 2.185830 0.0293 





Table 4: Least square results. Dependent Variable is ROA 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.197540 0.224592 0.879554 0.3796 
LABOR/A 0.094415 0.087026 1.084907 0.2785 
EQUITY/A 0.200242 0.014238 14.06423 0.0000 
LOAN/A 0.007695 0.002590 2.971416 0.0031 
MS 0.015280 0.003841 3.978588 0.0001 
UR -0.037868 0.019437 -1.948246 0.0520 
INF -0.043461 0.020308 -2.140148 0.0329 
EXR 2.00E-06 8.09E-05 0.024734 0.9803 
CRIS 0.000682 0.000890 0.765738 0.4442 
DCFPS -0.004374 0.001891 -2.313033 0.0212 
D1 0.001854 0.002211 0.838656 0.4021 
D2 0.012096 0.003240 3.733250 0.0002 
D3 -0.003270 0.001042 -3.138169 0.0018 
YEAR -0.004278 0.004881 -0.876439 0.3812 




Table5: Summary of results 
 IM/ASSETS IM/EQUITY ROA ROE 
C ( ** (  &  &  
LABOR/A & * & * &  &  
EQUITY/A & * ( * & * & * 
LOAN/A & * & * & * &  
MS &  &  & * & * 
UR (  (  ( *** ( * 
INF ( * ( ** ( ** ( * 
EXR (  (  &  &  
CRIS & ** & ** &  &  
DCFPS ( * ( * ( ** ( *** 
D1 & * & * &  &  
D2 & * & * & * & * 
D3 ( *** &  ( ** ( *** 
YEAR & ** &  (  (  
YEAR*YEAR ( ** (  &  &  
*    significant at the 1% level (two-tailed). 
**  significant at the 5% level (two-tailed). 
*** significant at the 10% level (two-tailed) 
 
 
VI. SOME COMMENTS ON THE RESULTS 
 
1. The determinants of NIM and Pre-tax Profits are not the same. In particular, we 
have found that CRIS and Labor/Assets impact on NIM only, whilst MS and UR 
are relevant for explaining ROA(E). 
2. Regarding bank-specific variables, the net interest margin reacts positively to 
operating costs, but pre-tax profits do not. This means that less efficient banks 
(that is, banks with higher operating costs) charge higher interest rates on loans (or 
pay lower rates on deposits), therefore passing those costs onto customers. 
However, competition does not allow them to ‘overcharge’ and thus all banks 
achieve similar profitability ratios. 
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3. Well-capitalised banks (ie, banks with higher equity/assets) face lower expected 
bankruptcy costs and thus lower funding costs and higher interest margins on 
assets. In general, this advantage ‘translates’ into better profitability ratios. 
4. The loan-to-asset ratio has a positive impact on interest margins and profitability. 
This could mean that in our sample-period banks did watch carefully the lending 
process. That is, they did not grant credit at all costs (relaxing credit selection and 
monitoring), just for the sake of organic growth. Thus, they seem to have been 
able to maintain low levels of non-performing loans, thereby increasing profits 
and margins. 
5. The market share variable is not significant when we explain the Net Interest 
Margin. If we consider that MS captures product differentiation as well as market 
power, then it appears that banks do not differentiate traditional loan and deposit 
products (and do not exert market power in these markets) but rather less 
‘conventional’ bank products and services. It also means that market structure is 
not relevant in those traditional activities; however, they do exert market power in 
some other bank products and services such as off-balance activity. 
6. Although with a negative sign in all regressions, the unemployment rate (as a 
proxy for the cyclical behaviour of the economy) is relevant in the two last 
equations only. Results are not better if we use the GDP growth rate instead. Also, 
results are not better if we use lagged values of UR and GDP. 
7. The inflation rate is relevant in all models. Inflation brings along higher costs but 
also higher income. It seems that bank costs increase more than do bank revenues. 
This contradicts findings from other studies (Barth et al 1997, Claessens, 
Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga 1998, Hanson and Rocha 1986, Demirguç-Kunt and 
Huizinga 1999, Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga 2000, Denizer 2000), but goes 
along the lines of earlier research (Wallich 1977, Petersen 1986). 
8. The nominal effective exchange rate does not have any impact on bank 
performance. However, the EMS crisis of 1992/3/4 seems to have had a positive 
impact on the net interest margin on assets but not on bank profitability. Under 
pressure, European authorities reacted by increasing short-term interest rates and 
that has had some impact on median and long-term rates. However, credit rates 
react generally faster than do deposit rates and thus the positive impact on the 
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interest margin. At the same time, exchange rate instability increases risk in cross-
border bank activity and losses could have occurred in foreign exchange 
transactions. Other bank costs may have also increased, thus offsetting increased 
bank revenues. 
9. Portuguese and Spanish banks suffered from the full liberalisation of capital 
movements, both in terms of interest margin and profitability. Given the increased 
competition brought about by liberalisation, fund holders did look for more 
efficient banking systems and more profitable applications, thus flowing out of 
these two countries. 
10. Banks in Portugal and Spain perform generally better than banks in Germany. 
However, French banks at the lower end of the spectrum. We can consider that in 
these four countries we have bank-based financial systems. And “after controlling 
for the level of financial development, there is some evidence that a more market-
based financial structure would lead to lower levels of bank profits” (Demirguç-
Kunt and Huizinga 2000, p.12). That seems to be the case of Portugal and Spain 
vis-à-vis France and Germany. The bank sector in Iberian countries thus 
represents for firms a larger source of funds than does the capital market, leading 
to superior performances for Portuguese and Spanish banks. As for France and 
Germany, 1995 data shows that total bank assets represent 119% of GDP in 
Germany (against the 99% in France), whilst stock market capitalization 
represents 34% of GDP in France and 24% in Germany (Demirguç-Kunt and 
Huizinga 1999, table3). Using the same reasoning, banks in France face more 
intense competition from the stock market and therefore show lower interest 
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